At 18:31 UTC on 24 September 2026, cryptocurrency exchange Bitget detected unauthorized transfers from parts of its hot- and warm-wallet infrastructure. The assets had already moved to addresses the exchange associated with the attacker.[1][3]

Bitget later put the amount involved at approximately $387.5 million. The revised total added assets and networks omitted from its first estimate.[2][3][4]

Deposits and trading remained available, but the exchange suspended withdrawals while it investigated the transfers and traced the assets.[1][3]

How the attacker reached the wallets

Bitget told The Block that the attacker exploited a vulnerability in an unnamed third-party security product and obtained high-level internal credentials. The attacker then used those credentials to submit fraudulent withdrawal commands that bypassed Bitget’s transaction controls.[2]

The wallet system processed the instructions, and the blockchain transfers completed. In practical terms, access that looked sufficiently privileged inside Bitget became real transfers outside the exchange.

Bitget said its private keys were not compromised.[2] Its explanation places the breach earlier in the chain: the attacker gained trusted internal access, created withdrawal commands and passed checks that should have separated legitimate instructions from fraudulent ones.

Investigation, recovery and customer protection

Bitget said it contained the incident and fixed the vulnerability.[1][2] It brought in Google-owned security firm Mandiant and blockchain security company SlowMist, published addresses linked to the attacker and worked with other organizations to freeze assets.[3]

The exchange also opened a recovery bounty program. It said its protection fund would cover losses suffered by affected users.[1][2][4]

Bitget announced a staged return of withdrawals: Bitcoin on 28 September, Ethereum on 29 September, USDT on 30 September, and remaining tokens, fiat withdrawals and peer-to-peer transactions on 2 October.[1][2]

The case shows how stolen access can make a fraudulent transfer look legitimate to the systems processing it. Once Bitget’s controls accepted the withdrawal commands, the blockchain did what it was instructed to do. The exchange’s response therefore had to operate on two fronts: restore its own systems and pursue assets that had already settled to external addresses.

Sources

  1. Bitget, “Bitget to Resume Withdrawals in Phases,” 26 September 2026 — https://www.bitget.com/support/articles/12560603896110
  2. The Block, “Bitget starts phased withdrawal resumption following $388 million exploit,” 28 September 2026 — https://www.theblock.co/news/business/2026-09-28-bitget-starts-phased-withdrawal-resumption-416965
  3. Bitget, “Security Incident Update: Fund Tracing and Recovery Bounty Program,” 25 September 2026 — https://www.bitget.com/support/articles/12560603896108
  4. Bitget, “Hot Wallet Incident,” 24 September 2026 — https://www.bitget.com/support/articles/12560603896024

Methodology · Corrections · Archived original